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INTRODUCTION: THE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS.
In the past, Western analysts of Soviet military affairs found the obsessive
secretivene.s of their study subject to be the main methodological obstacle in their research.
In those pe-glasnost' days they did not appreciate, however, the meihodological
advantages gained from stability and orthodoxy of the Brezhnev era. Statements by major
military fig ares as well as major publications by academics could be safely taken to reflect
a political c ecision already made. To take a relatively simple analytical case from the recent
past, in order to conclude that the Soviets were likely to attempt to develop a global power
projection nission, it was sufficient to observe the publication in 1972 by the Academy of
Sciences 0" a book advocating Soviet military support for wars of "national liberation," a
statement n 1974 by Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko that the USSR was ready to
resist "imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear," and
the pronouncement in 1976 by Soviet Navy C-in-C Admiral Gorshkov about the unique
ability of navies to achieve political results without actually resorting to war. 1 The
crescendo of Soviet military involvement in the Third World from Angola to Ethiopia to
Afghanistan is neatly predictable on the basis of such harmonious pronouncements.
This is in clear contrast to today's Soviet scene. For example, in 1988 the top
Soviet mil tary officers denied the possibility of unilateral Soviet troop cuts—until
Gorbachev announced a 500,000 unilateral cut in December 1988. 2 Or take another case:
on September 25, 1989, the Soviets promised to the U.S. to pull down their large phased-
array radar near Krasnoyarsk; on October 5, 1989, the Deputy Chief of General Staff Col.
Gen. Bronislav. Omelichev stated that the radar was legitimate; and then on October 24,
!See Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, Co: Westview
Press, 1984), 3rd ed., pp. 58-60.
2See, for instance, MSU S. Akh >meev, "Chto kroyetsya za bryussel'skim zayavleniem NATO," Krasnaya
zvezda, March 20, 1988, and " vstuplenie M.S. Gorbacheva na ...sessii ...OON," Vestnik MID, no. 24,
December 31. 1988.
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1989, the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze openly recognized the radar to be a
violation of the ABM Treaty. 3 Today the Soviet statements on national security issues are
much less cryptic than in the previous era, but predicting the policy outcome on the basis of
declaration.4 from responsible institutional actors has become equally more difficult.
Wh; t is the matter? In Stephen Meyer's apt phrase, "Gorbachev has brought policy
initiation out into the open; under his predecessors public doctrinal discussions reflected
decisions already taken."4 Moreover, this policy initiation and formation process is
becoming ncreasingly complicated as the pace of change in the Soviet Union is
accelerating . The Soviet political institutions are changing; new social forces are entering
the politica area; the politicization of the military is moving by leaps and bounds, etc.
Statements by various Soviet officials (military and civilian) related to naval matters are
frequently Dutdated before they are published. Whatever the plans made today by
politicians ind naval officers, the rapidly deteriorating economy might very well cancel,
delay and/o significantly distort them.
The current political and ideological confusion is well symbolized by the case of the
Tbilisi, the first Soviet "real" aircraft carrier. The first ship of that class, it was initially
called Leonid Brezhnev, apparently with the idea that subsequent ships will be named after
other leading personalities of that generation of Soviet leaders (Suslov? Andropov?
Chernenko ') When revelations under Gorbachev had made naming ships after the late
General Secretary and his henchmen clearly impossible, the navy opted for what then
seemed to be a safe and tested approach: to call the new ships after the capital cities of
Union Republics, beginning with Tbilisi, the capital city of Georgia. But what message is
conveyed by this name now: the massacre of anti-communist and anti-Russian
demonstrators in Tbilisi by the Soviet military? the virulent Georgian nationalist movement
3
"Sovmestnoe zayavlenie ministrov," Pravda, September 25, 1989; Yu. Kornilov "Snyat'
ozabochennost'," Krasnaya zvezda October 5, 1989; E. A. Shevardnadze, "Vneshnyaya politika i
perestroyka," fzvestiya, October 24, 1989.
4Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources And Prospects Of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking On Security,"
International Security, Fall 1988, vo. 13, no. 2, p. 130.
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demanding secession from 'he Soviet Union? the increasing draft resistance on the part of
the Georgian youth? And v hat should the two other planned ships of this class be called:
Vilnius? Yerevan? Kishinev '
Given this state of c onfusion, even an analysis of a broad range of political and
military factors may easily result in a forecast of more than one scenario of Soviet naval
developments.
THE POLITICAL FACTORS BEHIND BREZHNEV'S NAVAL BUILDUP.
In the Soviet approach to defense matters, the fundamental reasons for building a
military force and preparing it for use are given by the socio-political aspect of their military
doctrine, traditionally an exclusive domain of civilian party politicians. Today, the socio-
political aspect of the Soviet military doctrine is in as much disarray as the communist party
itself. It has lost the cohesion it has had for the last seventy years—a cohesion increasingly
achieved at the cost, one should add, of ignoring the political and economic realities of the
modern world. Several features of the socio-political aspect of the Soviet military doctrine
had a major impact on the Soviet Navy.
The whole world was viewed as an arena for pervasive "class struggle" between the
"capitalism," led by the United States, and the "socialism," led by the Soviet Union. No
developments could overshadow this basic conflict until the final and inevitable triumph of
socialism over capitalism. In this conflict, socialism represented the historical good, while
capitalism-ilie historical evil. The struggle between the two acquired the characteristics of
a zero-sum game, where the common good of mankind could be achieved only by
socialism's advances against capitalism.
All c f the above ha I direct implications for the Soviet Navy. The main enemy was
easy to pinpoint: the most powerful free-market democracy with the largest navy, i.e., the
United States whose unrelei ting hostility towards the USSR was assumed automatically.
The result was a navy fashioied for a war against the United States. Since the conflict had
a class character, the USSR had to build a navy for a conflict not only with the U.S., but
also with the latter's "class a lies:" NATO countries, capitalist neutral countries of Western
Europe such as Sweden, Japan and even China which by the late 1970s was viewed by
Soviet ideologists as an ally of "imperialism." Indeed, Mr. Gorbachev criticized Soviet
military policy of his predecessors as seeking to match the combined military power of
"any possible coalition" that is, of the United States, Western Europe, Japan and China.5
Such an approach to force planning was nothing less than a search for global military
dominance, and had to have a serious impact on the development of the Soviet Navy.
The international class struggle was considered to be so pervasive as to be truly
global: no n ation, however small and/or underdeveloped could be left out of it. Therefore,
the Soviet Is avy had to acquire an accordingly global reach. Since the triumph of socialism
had been predetermined, it was assumed that the Soviet Union would be gradually getting
stronger relative to the United States: therefore, it was assumed that the Soviet Union could
afford to bu Id up a balanced blue water navy. Even though the Soviet leaders began to say
in the mid- 1 970's that there would be no winners in a nuclear war, no revision was made
in the deter ninistic vision of the inevitable triumph of socialism, because such a revision
would have meant an acknowledgement of a huge exception to the theories of Marx and
Lenin. Consequently, the Soviet Navy, as the Soviet military in general, was built to fight
and win in a nuclear war, as acknowledged by the First Deputy Chief of the International
Department of the Central Committee of CPSU Vadim Zagladin who stated that until now
the Soviet Union made its military plans on the basis "of a possibility of victory in a nuclear
war." 6
5Cited in "Doklad E. A. Sheva dnadze," Vestnik Ministerstava inostrannykh del SSSR, 1988, no. 15, p.
36.
6
"Vneshnyaya politika i perestr /ka," Izvestiya, June 27, 1988.
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A very important aspect of Soviet politics underlying their military doctrine was
Great Russian nationalism In the realms of foreign and military policies, the Russian
nationalist sentiment has teen traditionally manifested through a preoccupation with
Russian Empire' status as c great power. Today when many of the historic patterns of
Russian ideology and politic al culture are rapidly revived, one should remember about the
traditional ink between the ideology of Great Russian nationalism and the navy.
In the end of the XIX—early XX centuries, Great Russian nationalism was an
important factor in the exp insion of the Russian empire. (Aggressive and expansionist
nationalisms were quite typ cal for the European powers of that period.) This had a direct
impact on Russia's naval policies. At the turn of the century, for example, a major naval
buildup program was stirrulated by Russia's expansion in the Far East.7 After that
program had miserably failed in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, the debates on a
new naval program brought into focus the relationship between the pursuit of a great power
status for the Russian Empire and the requirement for a blue water navy. The Army
proposed coastal defense as the primary mission for the navy because Russia was primarily
a land power. The Naval 1\ linister Adm. I. Dikov responded that Russia needed a strong
navy "as a great power," so hat it could be dispatched "where the interests of the state need
it." The Foreign Minister A. Izvol'skiy agreed: "This navy should.. .not be bound by a
particular mission of defending this or that sea or bay, it should operate where politics
requires it."8 Indeed, despite Russia' serious economic problems and its character as
nearly exclusively a landpower, the construction of a balanced navy capable of projecting
power far from Russian sh >res was undertaken; however, it had to be abandoned in the
course of World War I in th i interest of Russia's survival.
A similar language '^ /as used nearly seventy years later by Admiral Gorshkov in his
Sea Power of the State to pr )mote an ocean-going Soviet Navy as a powerful instrument of
7L. G. Beskrovnyy, Armiya ifl< Rossii v nachale XX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), p. 161.
8Ibid., pp. 193, 194.
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the Kremlin's great power policies.9 The Brezhnev era, during which a spectacular naval
buildup occurred, was characterized by an emphasis on the newly achieved status of the
Soviet Union as a military superpower, and by what Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze has termed an "imperial philosophy" which reigned in the Kremlin. Among
other thing? , it ignored the interests of the subjugated ethnic periphery of the S uviet Union.
The ethnic; lly Georgian foreign minister did not need to point to the self-evident fact that
the empire was Russian. Indeed, when offered the job of Foreign Minister in 1985,
Shevardnadze doubted the viability of his candidacy because he was not an ethnic
Russian. 10 (This, of course, does not mean that the Russian people were true beneficiaries
of the impe ial expansion and military buildup.)
Lasi, but not least, the decades of emphasis on international conflict and rigid
command r ilitical-economic system at home have resulted in a militarization of the Soviet
political cu ture as a whole as well as in a creation of a huge military-industrial complex (as
many Soviets now refer to it) which consumes more than 1/3 of all industrial labor and
more than one half of all research and development effort in the Soviet Union. 11 This
military-industrial complex came into its own during Brezhnev's era, characterized by the
General Secretary's reluctance to make hard choices and confront powerful bureaucratic
interests. Today there is more than enough documentation to show how unchecked
bureaucracies engaged in various gigantic self-serving projects; the military and defense
industry in general, protected by extraordinary security and militarism of the political
culture, an I the navy and shipbuilding and related industries in particular, created a
powerful looby for the naval buildup.
9Adm. S. Gorshkov, Morskaya n oshch' gosudarstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), pp. 365-371.
10Eduard Shevardnadze, "Ubezf lat' pravdoy," Ogonyok, 1990, no. 11, reproduced in USSR Today. Soviet
Media News and Features Dige. ', March 24, 1990, p. 1.
^S. Blagovolin, "Geopolitichi ;kie aspekty oboronitel'noy dostatochnosti," Kommunist, 1990, no. 4,
reproduced in USSR Today. Sov t Media News and Features Digest, March 20, 1990, pp. 29, 35, 36.
This, the Soviet naval programs of the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's were
determined by a political culture which put Marxist-Leninist ideology into a frame of
Russian great power interest*, as well as by the activities of a conglomerate of institutional
interests. All these three fa< tors contributed to the naval expansion into the Third World.
The attempt to build a bala iced blue-water navy in general was also due to these three
factors. The selecting of rep alsion of an aerospace attack as a top priority navy mission (as
promoted by a recent Soviet book which made a considerable impression in the U.S.) 12 is
supported by the Marxist-Leninist views of war as the last great battle of classes. It shows
the militarization of political culture and decision-making, as well as the triumph of the self-
interest of the military-industrial complex (it is a very expensive mission). In contrast, the
use of SSBNs for nuclear leterrence or the defense of the coastal zones is much less
specific for any set of ideolo ;ical and political factors.
DISINTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL
STRUCTURE. EMERGENCE OF NEW IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL
STRUCTURES.
From Stalin to Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership confidently drew the line of
ideological and political battle. Political systems that had communist party monopoly on
power, rigid ideological controls and centralized command economies were considered
socialist. Opposed to them were capitalist systems with their political and ideological
pluralism, and free market economies. Friends and enemies were identified, and that
imparted a crude cohesion to the Kremlin's policies. In contrast, Gorbachev's regime has
12Vyunenko N.P. et al., Voenno-morskoy flot: rol', perspektivy razvitiya, ispol'zovanie (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1988), pp. 219-235; for U.S. reaction, see The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989, pp.
136-148.
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clearly lost its ideological bearings. His chief ideological advisor Aleksandr Yakovlev
defines socialism in a way not really different from Western social-democracy, and implies
that this is the rather distant ideal for the Soviets to pursue. 13 Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze mocks the traditional class approach to foreign policy:
The critics of perestroika accuse us of betraying the class
principles, while the "class enemy" is providing us with
[disposable] syringes, equipment for treating bums, artificial
limbs, wheel chairs, sends us physicians and bone
marrow. 14
He has further said that "a state which is founded on the narcotic of an 'enemy image' has
no right to exist." 15
It would have been a simplification to say that such ideas constitute today's "party
line," because they came under severe and open attack during several recent CPSU Central
Committee plenary meetings and the XXVIII Party Congress. The traditional communist
ideology is undergoing a transformation from the overwhelming doctrine which determined
policies in all major spheres of action to an ideology actively espoused only by a dwindling
number of high-ranking officials of the communist party, the military and the KGB.
Although on the way to extinction in its pure form, this ideology, by virtue of its
domination of Russian-Soviet intellectual life for more than seventy years, is likely to leave
a significant imprint on the now emerging political culture. 16
This decline of ideology has been paralleled by a similar transformation of the
CPSU's power structure. Since the establishment of the office of the President of the
USSR in March 1990, and of the Presidential Council, the Politburo's decision-making
13Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Sotsializm: ot mechty k real'nosti," Kommunist, 1990, no. 4, reproduced in
USSR Today. Soviet Media News and Features Digest,, March 20, 1990, especially see p. 25.
14Eduard Shevardnadze, "Konsolidatsiya KPSS v usloviyakh mnogopartiynosti," Literaturnaya gazeta,
April 18, 1990.
15Leonid Pleshakov, "Ubezhdat' prvdoy," Ogonyok, 1990, # 11, reproduced in UUSSR Today. Soviet
Media News and Features Digest, March 24, 1990, p. 2.
16For an analysis of such an imprint, see Aleksandr Tsipko, "Khoroshi li nashi printsipy," Novyy Mir,
1990, no. 7, pp. 173-204.
powers began to be progres dvely narrowed down to party affairs only. 17 This process has
found its logical conclusion at the XXVIII Party Congress, which decided, under
Gorbachev's pressure, to ch ange rather drastically the character of the Politburo: its size
(twenty four people) and its composition (fifteen members represent ex officio the
communist parties of Union Republics, which are demoralized and in retreat in the face of
growing nationalist movements) will ensure a very substantial reduction of this body's role
in the national policymaking. The Secretariat of the Central Committee has retained its
member in charge of the defense industrial issues, Oleg Baklanov, but there is clearly no
"senior secretary" (i.e., a secretary who is also a member of the Politburo) in charge of
military issues as a whole. It was announced that in the course of the latest reorganization
of the Central Committee in October 1990, that body lost all its mechanisms for controlling
the military and the KGB. The national security decision-making has been shifted into the
President's office, that of the Presidential Council and the Defense Council, now
apparently attached to the President. More details have to emerge to allow a definitive
statement on this subject. 18
It is premature to say that the formulation of defense policies has become open to
more than a group of top political and military leaders. This will not be so until the popular
representative character of the Supreme Soviet is firmly established, its independence of the
executive power of the President proven, and the umbilical cord between the Committee on
Defense and State Security and the military-industrial complex, cut 19 Nevertheless the fake
public consensus on matters of national security which prevailed during the last 70 years,
has been broken. Civilian analysts from the USSR Academy of Sciences Research
17Alexander Rahr "From Politbu o to Presidential Council," Report on the USSR, June 1, 1990, pp. 1-5.
18
"Rech' M. Gorbacheva pered o itserami," reproduced in USSR Today. Soviet Media News and Features
Digest, August 17, 1990, p. 15; FE/RL, Daily Report , no. 193, October 10, 1990.
19See Mikhail Tsypkin, "The C mmittee for Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet,"
Report on the USSR, vol. 2, no. 19, pp. 8-11.
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Institutes have been criticizing practically all aspects of Soviet military posture, much to the
angry shock of many Soviet generals.20
While it is difficult to measure the real influence of such civilian analysts, it is quite
obvious that beginning with the acceptance of zero-option for the INF Treaty, the military
had on one occasion after another to abandon their highly publicized positions on security
matters, while the political leaders adopted arms reductions policies advocated by civilians.
To make matters worse foi the politically conservative military establishment, some of
these policies—decoupling of INF talks from START and of talks on strategic offensive
systems from talks on "space" systems—were advocated by Andrei Sakharov, who was
loathed by many in the military.
The consensus on military matters has been shattered even at the top of the national
security decision-making nachinery, as demonstrated by the open feud between the
Foreign Minister, member of the Presidential Council and (until the XXVIII Party
Congress) Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze and the military. One line of conflict
has involved no less an i ;sue than the LPAR near Krasnoyarsk. Within days after
Shevardnadze had pledged to destroy the radar and thus implicitly acknowledged that it was
a violation of the ABM Treaty, the Ministry of Defense daily newspaper had printed an
article signed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Gen. Bronislav Omelichev
flatly denying any violatior .21 Even after Shevardnadze publicly described the radar as a
violation,22 high-ranking Soviet military officers avoid directly endorsing this point of
view.23 For instance, when Marshal Sergei Akhromeev was asked about the subject
during his testimony in the U.S. Senate in May 1990, he replied: "Our Foreign Minister,
20The most prominent example ( f this new phenomena are the duels between Georgiy Arbatov and Aleksei
Arbatov, on the one hand, and /arious high-ranking military officers. See, for istance, Alexei Arbatov,
"How Much Defence Is Sufficieit?" International Affairs, April 1989, pp. 31-44, and Major-General Yu.
Lyubimov, "O dostatochnosti oborony i nedostatke kompetentosti," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,
1989, no. 16, pp. 21-26.
21Col. General B. Omelichev, "S nyat' ozabochennost," Krasnya zvezda, October 5, 1989.
22E. A. Shevardnadze, "Vneshnyaya politika i perestroika," Izvestiya, October 24, 1989.
^Hearing of the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, May 8,
1980, B-2-7, p. 2.
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who is a member of our government, said that deployment of that radar ... was a violation
of the ABM Treaty, and we ire now dismantling it." This is hardly a ringing endorsement!
As this case was of uch a great importance for Soviet foreign policy, the military
were in effect challenging n Jt only Shevardnadze, but, by implication, Mikhail Gorbachev
himself. Their willingnes: to challenge him was amply demonstrated at the founding
Congress of the Russian C mmunist Party and several weeks later at the XXVIII Party
Congress, where several mi itary officers attacked various aspects of Gorbachev's security
policies.
Another line of con lict has resulted from the explanations about the massacre of
demonstrators in Tbilisi, Ge >rgia, in April 1989. Shevardnadze has been publicly accused
by several high-ranking mil tary officers of lying for his criticism of the military role in the
tragedy.24 Certainly, this is a turbulent atmosphere for decision-making on major military
matters.
The conservative cl allenges to "new thinking" have probably gone beyond the
verbal stage and into polic /making area. In his rebuttal to critics at the XXVIII Party
Congress Gorbachev hinted at this:
Those who hold important government jobs, who are
directly invc Ived with our international activities, even if
they disagre* with the policies of the country's leadership,
must implem *nt the state-approved policies even against their
personal opii ion. It is impermissible that the President and
the governm nt have one [policy] line, and somebody else
has a differe it one and is implementing it. ... Everybody in
government . ervice should be loyal to the government. And
if they are d< cent people and disagree with the government
policies, let t lem resign.25
24Lt. General A. F. Katusev, "Proshu opublikovat'," Sovetskaya Rossiya, March 25, 1990; Col. Gen. I.
Rodionov, "Lish" polnaya pravda mozhet ubedit'," Literaturnaya Rossiya April 20, 1990.
25
"Vysteuplenie M. S. Gorbachcva," Pravda, July 1 1, 1990.
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The turbulence is further increased by the explosion of nationalism. Neither the
Soviet planners, nor the Western observers can be absolutely certain about the future
borders and composition of the Soviet Union. The Baltic republics are striving to leave it
altogether; others, like the Ukraine, have proclaimed the right (so far theoretical) to have
their own armed forces, and have demanded the withdrawal of their conscripts from the
Soviet Armed Forces; the Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin, while recognizing the
USSR's primacy in matters of defense, is planning to establish a position of RSFSR
Minister of Defense to look after the armed forces' activities in the Russian republic.
Greater or complete independence for the Baltic republics and the Ukraine , Moldavia and
Georgia will certainly reduce the dominant the status of the Russian navy in the Baltic and
Black seas. Will Russia, truncated in Europe to its ethnically Russian territories, continue
to be Euro-centric; or will it direct its major interests to the Far East and the Pacific?
There are indications of increased interest in the Far East and Pacific across the
board of the emerging Russian nationalist consciousness. Boris Yeltsin made a point of
visiting the Far East and emphasizing its special importance for Russia.26 At the other
extreme, in an article published by Morskoy sbornik, one of the most outspoken
conservative Russian nationalists and militarists, Karem Rash, advocated a greater effort to
establish Russian military, i olitical and economic influence on the Pacific shores.27 At the
same time, however, some Soviet "military theoreticians" now tend to view the USSR not
as a superpower but as "a European country with Asian interests."28
While the attention of Western observers is primarily focused on explosions of
minority nationalisms, the most important geopolitical phenomenon today is the
transformation of the Russian nation's imperial identity. It is difficult to distinguish
between the Russian nations 1 interest and the needs of the Russian-dominated multi-ethnic
26Stanislav Glukhov, "Chelovek dolzhen rabotat' spokoyno," Moskovskie novosti, September 2, 1990.
27Karem Rash, "Okeanicheskoe myshlenie," Morskoy sbornik, 1989, no. 7, p. 10.
28Viktor Altaev, "Vooruzhennye Sily SSSR: v kontse puti," Vek XX i mir, no. 6, 1990, p. 29.
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empire. It will be probably easier to define the national interests of Russia in a Russian
nation- state (that is, a country, on the territory of today's RSFSR, where the ethnic
Russians are in an overwhelming majority). But since such a nation-state might emerge
only as a result of the loss of the Soviet/Russian empire, this may also leave the national
psyche traumatized, and thus subject to unpredictable and violent metamorphoses. Will the
emancipation of the Russian nation from the imperial burden result in it turning its energies
inward, or would it be a prelude to a new effort at expansion?
All these conflicts and uncertainties could not have endowed the Soviet defense
policy-making with anything like its past consistency. Indeed, some Soviet observers are
saying bluntly that their country's leadership is having a hard time determining the Soviet
Union's naiional interests.29 This exceptionally fluid political context for the Kremlin's
national security decision-making should be kept in mind when undertaking an analysis of
the impact of Gorbachev's policies on current and future missions of the Soviet Navy.
SOVIET MILITARY THINKING AND GORBACHEV'S "NEW
THINKING."
The Soviet military thinking is characterized by certain peculiarities which make an
assimilation of Gorbachev's "new thinking" a far from smooth process. The intellectual
horizons of several generations of Soviet military officers (since Stalin's purges destroyed
the last of Tsarist military intellectuals and the more daring military thinkers of Soviet
formation) have been artificially limited to the subject of warfighting. While the Soviet
higher education in general has not fostered the spirit of free inquiry, the military education
has narrowly focused on warfighting skills. Even more importantly, the study of
29A. Kortunov, A. Izyumov, " hto ponimat' pod gosudarstvennymy interesami vo vnezhney politike?"
Literaturnaya gazeta, July 11, IS >0.
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warfighting has been heavily concentrated on operational-tactical aspects; military strategy
(the level at which the major issues such as winnability of nuclear war are most
appropriately raised) has been studied only by the small minority of students admitted to the
Voroshilov General Staff Academy.30
The education of So /iet officers leaves no room for free debate, makes the officers
extremely uncomfortable v ith unorthodox ideas, fosters an intellectual climate in which
unpleasant realities are frequently avoided by simply denying them. The General Staff
theoretical journal Voennaya mysl' notes that Soviet officers do not know how to debate,
how to deal with dissenting views. That is not surprising in view of the character of their
education:
In military history courses as they are taught in the military
institutions of higher education, not one lecture hour is
devoted to learning the methods of scholarly debate. As a
result, some comrades in the course of discussions
frequently attempt to present their emotions, proposals,
personal impressions and even inventions as historical
facts.31
The majority of top Soviet military officers have graduated from the General Staff
Academy, but we should tal e note of the fact that these officers for the first time dealt with
the subject of strategy when they were already close to the apex of their careers (the
students' ranks at the General Staff Academy range from lieutenant colonel to major
general, and respective navy ranks).32 Common sense suggests that younger individuals
are generally more open to new ideas than the older ones. There is no statistical data
proving conclusively that critical evaluation of new study materials is substantially lower
among successful middle and high-ranking officers in their late thirties and forties than
30N. Sautin, "Polkovodtsami ne rozhdayutsya," Izvestiya, November 1, 1986.
31Major General A. G. KhorTtov, "Istoricheskiy opyt v razvitii voennoy nauki," Voennaya mysl', 1990,
no. 6, p. 33.
32Harriet Fast Scott and Williair F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1984), p. 385.
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among juni jr officers in their late twenties. The tendency of senior officers, however, to
be more sk optical about Gorbachev's reforms than the junior officers, indicates the former
group is les ; receptive to new ideas in general and the "new thinking" in particular, than the
latter one.
Of £ll the social/professional groups in the Soviet society, the military officers have
been perha; >s the most closely watched from the point of view of their political loyalty,
primitively interpreted as a blind obedience to the current party line. They have been well
trained nev' x to question the tenets of the official doctrine, which embraced, as mentioned
earlier, the oncept "of a possibility of victory in a nuclear war." 33
Thi. bespeaks of a Marxist double-think. After all, the drive for conventional
warfighting capability and escalation dominance, which the Soviets pursued at such a great
cost since he 1960s, is a manifestation of their ardent desire to avoid a nuclear war
presumabl) because of its catastrophic consequences. But drawing the next logical
conclusion, namely that a confrontation which can easily escalate into self-destruction no
longer mal es any political or military sense, turned out to be impossible for political
reasons. / straightforward recognition that a fact of technological development had
cancelled the inevitability of the Marxist vision of history would have been subversive to
the existing Soviet political structure based precisely on this historical determinism.
The Soviet military has chosen history as a solution to this double-think dilemma.
Military hi tory has become a proxy for dealing with tomorrow's military art. Military
history has been primarily attractive because it is both glorious and safe. It is glorious
because its lessons have been for the most part derived from the victorious experiences of
World Wai II. Use of military history has been safe because it involves events and
concepts th; t had already received an official political evaluation, be it the battles against the
Germans ai d the Japanese, or the experiences of "local wars" from the 1950s to the 1980s.
33
"Vneshnyc ya politika i perestroyka," fzvestiya, June 27, 1988.
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The result has been a peculiar approach, matching (and quite creatively!) a visionary
treatment of emerging military technologies with a perception of war derived from the
experience: of the 1940s: a very costly and destructive affair, enhanced to a truly global
level by th ; new technological capabilities, resulting in the victor's transplanting his
political system onto the vanquished.34 Gorbachev recently confirmed this saying that the
Soviet "concept of security was to a considerable degree rooted in the consequences and
lessons of ... the war against Germany."35 It is likely that the Chernobyl nuclear disaster
made the Soviet political leadership and military high command, both previously numbed
by the rhetoric of their own inti-nuclear peace offensives to its message, suddenly wake up
to its meaning.36 Now the 5 oviet military must reconcile the conflict between the realities
of modem technology and tl eir military strategy.
An dditional difficulty is presented by the fact that the "new thinking" is an idea
generated nd actively pn moted by civilian scholars. The Soviet military have no
experience >f working with ;ivilian analysts on issues of military doctrine. To be fair, one
should say hat the Soviet civilian analysts' enthusiasm for giving advice to the military is
substantial / greater than t leir actual experience in military affairs. Most of them are
newcomer; to this field. The Soviet Union lacks a core of civilian analysts of military
affairs like the ones in t'le U.S.--individuals with long-time experience of direct
involvement with the mili ary by virtue of research contracts, jobs in the Pentagon,
previous rr litary service, et :. The Soviet military is inclined to mistrust these newcomers
and their c )inions. The elaboration between the two groups is still practically non-
existent, or e of the rare, alb< it prominent exceptions being a paper co-authored by the "new
34See, for ir stance, Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, comp., The Voroshilov Lectures, vol. I, Issues of Soviet
Military Straegy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), pp. 69-75; Marshal of the
Soviet Unior N. Ogarkov, Istoriya uchit bditel'nosti (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 77; Yu. Ya. Kirshin et
al., Politiche skoe soderzhanie sovremennykh voyn (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), p. 256.
35
"Rech' M. Gorbacheva pered ofitserami," p. 12.
36Gorbachev has spoken quite Muntly about the impact of Chernoby on Soviet national security policy;
see "Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbach va," Pravda, July 11, 1990.
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thinker" Andrei Kokoshin and First Deputy Chief of General Staff Army Gen. Vladimir
Lobov. 37
The second contradiction that the Soviet military now has to confront is the
relationship between military capabilities and the nation's economy. For decades, the party
line was that economic strength was a key ingredient in the global "correlation of forces";
the Soviet military repeated ad nauseam that it was the spectacular growth of the Soviet
socialist economy that permitted the no less spectacular growth of the Soviet military
capabilities and achievement of strategic parity with the United States.38 It turns out that
neither is true. The defense policy-making in effect ignored economic realities: military
requirements had an absolute priority over the economic resources; as the Deputy Chairman
of the Defense Council Lev Zaykov testified at the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990, until
1985 the Defense Council first approved military programs, and only then means for full
financing were found.39 It has also turned out that the Soviet economic growth has been
much less than claimed. Without reliable economic statistics nobody now knows what the
real Soviet GNP is, and what it was at different moments in Soviet history when this or
that decision on defense spending was made. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has even
challenged the legitimacy of the concept of U. S. -Soviet military parity:
The time has come to recognize that there can be no parity
between two nations if it is not backed up by comparable
volumes of GNP and comparable levels of scientific and
technological development.40
The military is under pressure to learn how to adjust its requirements to unpleasant
economic realities.
37A. A. Kokoshin, V. N. Lobov "Predvidenie," Znamya, 1990, no. 2, pp. 170-182.
38Ogarkov, Istoriya uchit bditel'nosti, p. 78.
39See the speech by Lev Zaykov at the 28th CPSU Congress, Pravda, July 4, 1990.
40Shevardnadze, "Konsolidatsiy; KPSS v usloviyakh mnogopartiynosti."
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The learning process is complicated by the unique position of the military in Soviet
society. Given the weak legitimacy of the political system and the growth of centrifugal
nationalist forces, the armed forces are the main pillar of Soviet internal stability, the main
power that keeps the empire together. This makes Gorbachev wary of pressuring the
military too far too fast to adjust to the "new thinking."
Finally, in adapting to the "new thinking," the Soviet military share a problem with
any military establishment of a nuclear power. If any major conflict can become nuclear,
and if unwinnability of a nuclear war is openly recognized in the doctrine, how are the
armed forces to be structured, armed and motivated? The Soviets have not found an
answer to this question as yet.
THREAT ASSESSMENT: SOVIET VIEWS.
The Soviet Navy i eeds a threat even more than the U.S. Navy. The latter's
prominent share in the allocation of resources is protected by the tradition and the
consensus (correct or not) among the public that American well-being depends on her
Navy's ability to protect freedom of navigation worldwide. The Russian/Soviet naval
tradition is full of ups and downs. There were periods in this century when Russia/USSR
managed to survive practically without a navy. The ground forces have been crucial for
survival of the Russian/So\ iet empire against external and internal threat, while the navy
has never played such a major role. Given the enormous expense of maintaining a modem
navy, and the disastrous performance of the Soviet economy, the Soviet Navy (VMF-
Voenno-Morskoy Flot) needs an identifiable enemy to justify its existence as more than a
coastal defense force.
It is not surprising tl at the VMF command has continued to point to the U.S. Navy
as the main threat. This is ue both for the threat assessments made in the earlier period of
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Gorbachev's rule and those l^eing made public now.41 If the current political thaw between
the two superpowers and the disintegration of communist system and ideology within the
USSR continue, a threat assessment more sophisticated than the still prevalent reference to
the evils of American impeiialism will have to be found. There are initial indications that
the new threat assessment is likely to be driven by the estimates of destructive potential
possessed by other powers mixed with a more realistic evaluation of their intentions, freed
from Marxist-Leninist determinism. For example, participants in a recent civilian-military
conference have come up with two different categories for threat assessment: war potential
(the weapons deployed by other power/s) and war threat (the likelihood of a war), or
capabilities and intentions in American terminology.42
If an approach like this is adopted, the U. S. Navy will continue to be a major
measuring stick for Soviet naval capabilities and the point of departure for assigning
missions to VMF simply by virtue of USN "war potential," even if the "war threat"
presented b/ the U.S. will be judged negligible. First, the existence of nuclear weapons
makes "wai potential" of the U. S. tremendous even after very deep cuts in the strategic
offensive forces. Second, it will take a rather prolonged period of global peace and stability
before the U. S. reduces its conventional naval capabilities down to a level when the U. S.
naval "war potential" could be discounted. There is, of course, no guarantee that the
security relationship between the USSR and USA will not become more complicated again
(for instance, if the Soviet Union or its successor state/s fail to be integrated into an
international security system common with the West); then the "war threat" presented by
the U.S. and their navy will naturally be seen by Moscow as more grave.
41For the earlier threat assessment by VMF C-in-C, see, for instance, ADM V. Chernavin, "Vysokaya
bditel'nost' i boevaya gotovnost' -velenie vremeni," Mosrkoy sbornik, 1988, no. 2, p.3, and, of course, N.
P. Vyunenko et al., Voenno-moi skoy flot: rol', perspektivy razvitiya, ispol'zovanie (Moscow, Voenizdat,
1988), pp.3-10, 16-26; for \ later threat assessment, see ADM V. Chernavin, "Bor'ba na
kommunikatsiyakh: uroki voyn i sovremennost'," Morskoy sbornik, 1990, no. 2, p. 32; Captain 1st Rank,
V. Mikhailov, "Morskaya strate iya SShA," Voennaya mysl', 1990, no. 1
, pp. 59-65.
42
"Common Sense and Defence ' International Affairs, 1990, no. 5, pp. 143, 144.
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Tht changing politi« al situation makes Soviet naval officers and civilian analysts
look for n( w threats—or pi ove the absence of such. For instance, one of the suddenly
prominent 'new thinkers," Sergei Blagovolin (a scholar at the Academy's Institute for
World Eco lomics and Inte national Relations—IMEMO), advocates a defensive military
posture no' directed specifi ;ally at any target nation or group of nations. In his opinion,
this posture would be comp arable to the French declaratory military posture of deterrence
against all potential threat-;, East and West, assumed by Charles de Gaulle, with the
difference that the posture proposed by the Soviet scholar would assume no hostile
intentions in relations between major powers—an assumption ds Gaulle would have hardly
shared.
A military posture o ' this type leaves no room for such ;i prime instrument of power
projection as the aircraft c irrier. Blagovolin suggests the carriers' exclusion from the
Soviet shi] building prograr u At the same time, Blagovolin is concerned about the threats
to global s ability coming fom military conflicts between Third World regional powers,
such as th< Iraq-Iran war; ne agrees that such factors do affect the military policies of
developed nations. Nevertheless, he avoids drawing conclusions from the above for the
Soviet military posture and for solving the contradiction between his prescription against
naval power projection and its role in containing and extinguishing conflicts in the Third
World.43
It is noteworthy th it an article by a VMF officer, very different in tone from
Blagovolin's (it assumes cuirent great threat from the West) published by the General Staff
journal Voennaya mysi {Military Thought), also points to the growing military strength of
new Third World powers.4 1 Whatever the threats of future, however, the United States
43 S. Blagovolin, "Geopolitich skie aspekty oboronitel'noy dostatochnosti," Kommunist, 1990, no. 4,
reproduced in USSR Today. Soi et Media News and Features Digest,, March 20, 1990, pp. 5-6.
^Captain 1st Rank V. A. Galk vskiy, "O roli voenno-morskikh sil v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh,"
Voennaya mysl', 1990, no. 1, j 75.
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continues to be the curren threat for the purposes of determining the Soviet military
posture, inc luding the naval one.
The Soviet Navy rr ust have two special problems in adapting to such military
aspects of i he "new thinkin g" as the defensive strategy and reasonable sufficiency. The
defensive strategy is define d under a strong influence of Russia's military tradition as a
land powei 45 It concerns tself predominantly with ground-keeping one's own without
seizing the enemy's. Reasonable sufficiency is the minimum capability required to achieve
these goals. Apparently the civilian academics who came up with these concepts have been
as influenced by the Soviet/ Russian infantryman's mindset as the Ground Forces generals
who have i un the General Staff. VMF has an obvious problem with this approach, as
Admiral Chernavin has indicated:
...when we aie asked today whether building aircraft carriers
contradicts c ur defensive doctrine, my answer is: no. We
see their mai 1 mission as carrying fighter aircraft, which can
provide cove r to our ships at a great distance where shore-
based fighter aviation is of no help. This defensive mission
is integral to the new Tbilisi aircraft carrier...But what does
defensive mean? Some people understand it in a simplistic
and primitive way. They think that once we have adopted
such a doctrine, we can be only a passive side, to be on the
defensive, to retreat in case of conflict into the depth of our
territory. But modern war-on land, at sea, and in the air—is
above all the war of maneuver. How can a combat ship fight
while "sitting in a trench?" A submarine must find and sink
the enemy. The mission of surface ships is, when
necessary, to launch missile strikes against the enemy
without waiting for him to enter our territorial waters.46
A second important distinction between the navy and the rest of the armed forces as
far as application of reasonable sufficiency is concerned, is the dividing line drawn by the
4
^The late Adm. Gorshkov was ipparently aware of the land power mentality of his audience, because in
his Sea Power of the State he found it necessary to explain that "[t]he naval forces do not form a front line,
they are mobile, their actions arc not related to advance, seizure or keeping of space. ... Victory in a naval
battle or operation does not alw ys mean the achievement of any territorial changes." Adm. S. Gorshkov,
Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva vioscow: Voenizdat, 1979), p. 339.
46
"Kommentariy Glavnokoma duyushchego Voenno-Morskim Flotom strany admirala flota V. N.
Chernavina ," Pravda Octoberl' 1989.
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"new thinking" between gei eral purpose and strategic forces. The level of general purpose
forces is to be determined b/ the minimum requirements of defensive strategy, as specified
above. The strategic forces strength is to be determined by the requirements to maintain
superpower parity. The relationship between general purpose and strategic forces' levels
appears therefore to be we iker or non-existent. This is logical when applied to ground
forces and the strategic rocl et forces: the latter's security puts rather minimal requirements
on the former's size and deployment. This is far from the case, however, when it comes to
the naval general purpose forces and SSBNs: the latter's safety is difficult to obtain without
appropriate strength of the former.
VMF MISSIONS.
The Soviet literature on naval matters shows relatively little consistency when
describing VMF missions. The late Adm. Sergei Gorshkov distinguished the general fleet
against fleet and fleet against shore missions, each of them embracing a variety of sub-
missions, and the use of the navy for promoting the interests of the state in peacetime,
especially through pressure in local conflicts.47 The 1986 edition of the authoritative
Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary in a similar fashion characterized navy missions as (a)
destruction of enemy economic centers and military targets, and (b) destruction of his naval
forces; these missions embrace, in the order listed, nuclear strikes against enemy land
targets, destruction of his navy at sea and in port, interdiction of enemy's and defense of
friendly SLOCs, aid to ground forces operations on continental theaters of strategic military
actions, landing of assault groups and defending against enemy sea-borne assaults,
transporting troops and materiel, etc.48
47Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch' >osudarstva
, pp. 318-330, 346-372.
^Voennyy entsiklopedicheskiy ,\ ovar' (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), p. 141.
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The latest authoritative effort to define the missions for the Soviet Navy came in a
1987 book Wavy: Role, Perspectives of Development, Missions, written by a group of
VMF schol ir-officers, edited by N. P. Vyunenko, and prefaced by Adm. Gorshkov, his
last appearance in print. That book distinguishes the following missions: repulsion of
aerospace attack, suppression of enemy military-economic potential, destruction of
groupings of enemy armed forces on land, and participation in regional conflicts.49 For the
purposes of this study I will use these categories of navy missions as the latest put forward
by VMF.
Repulsion of Aerospace Attack.
This mission was brought into sharp focus by an unprecedentedly detailed and
frank (for an unclassified publication) book edited by Vyunenko.50 "Repulsion of
aerospace attack" is presented in the book as the primary mission for VMF: to destroy, at
the very outset of hostilities, the platforms of enemy sea-based strategic weapons before
they have a chance to launch missiles from under the water, from the surface of the oceans,
and "as far as possible," from the air (apparently, a reference to ALCMs).51 This mission
involves:
• constant surveillance of enemy strategic weapons platforms, especially SSBNs, cruise
missiles and their launch platforms, and also aircraft carriers, by friendly forces;
• split-second decision to destroy enemy platforms before they can launch;




• operation on a global level of a number of task forces, consisting of attack submarines,
surface ASW ships, and aircraft;
• enemy SSBNs are to be destroyed at the outset of hostilities irrespectively of nuclear or
conventional character of the war,
• continuous deployment of large naval task forces.52
Destruction of enemy sea-born nuclear weapons platforms is not a new mission to
the Soviet Navy. The use of VMF to destroy enemy SSBNs and other strategic systems
(such as aircraft carriers) has been advocated in authoritative Soviet military writings since
early 1960's.53 Adm.Gorshkov viewed "the use of naval forces against enemy sea-based
strategic nuclear systems in order to undermine or maximally weaken their strikes against
land targets" as an integral component of the "fleet against shore" mission of VMF.54 The
goal of "destroying carriers before they approached the deck-based aviation launch points
and of combating submarines before they launched ballistic missiles" was moved to the
forefront in the early 1970's.55 At that time ASW became an integral part of all Soviet
major naval exercises.56 But never before has it been singled out as the primary mission of
VMF with the potential to become "a mission of state importance."57
Vyunenko's book is not the only source suggesting that the "Repulsion of
Aerospace Attack" mission was given a particular priority in the 1980's. A recent
description of the "fifth" (mid- 1980's to the "present") post-World War II period in the
development of the Soviet naval art lists "destroying enemy naval offensive force
52Ibid., pp. 221-225, 231.
53James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare (Boulder, CO: Wesrview Press, 1986), pp. 57,
58.
54Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva
, p. 329.
55Captain 2nd Rank V. DotsenVo, "Soviet Art of Naval Warfare in the Postwar Period," Morskoy Sbornik,
1989, no. 7, p.27.
56Donald C. Daniel, "Trends ai 1 Patterns in Major Soviet Naval Exercises," in Paul J. Murphy, ed., Naval
Power in Soviet Policy (U.S. ( P.O.: Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 226.
57Vyunenko N.P. et al., Voem '-morskoy flot, p. 223.
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groupings t ) disrupt nucleai missile strikes against the territory of the USSR" as one of the
top-priority missions of VMF.58 Adm. Chernavin wrote in January 1989 that:
the engagement of an enemy navy's striking forces develops
into an independent mission inasmuch as those forces are
platforms for nuclear missile weapons by which it is
possible to achieve both tactical and operational-strategic
objectives. 59
The strategic and operational concepts of the "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack"
mission are rooted in a concrete period in the evolution of Soviet military doctrine and in
politics of the same period. From the late 1960's on, the Soviets were looking for a way to
win a major war against NATO without being subject to nuclear attack. Thus appeared the
concept of Soviet conventional theater offensive, with its primary objective being the
destruction of enemy nuc ear weapons and delivery systems by Soviet conventional
weapons. 60
The approach to operations against enemy SSBNs found in Vyunenko's book
suggests the same purpose in naval operations. It appears that enemy SSBNs are to be
destroyed exclusively or pr marily by conventional naval weapons: there is no mention of
the use of nuclear weapons in this context, and the great emphasis on the need for detection
of enemy SSBNs indicates that conventional weapons are to be used in "Repulsion of
Aerospace Attack." If the authors had meant that nuclear weapons would play a weapon of
choice in destroying enemy naval platforms carrying strategic offensive systems, they
would have included in their detailed description of this mission a barrage by the "rocket-
nuclear weapons" against the known and suspected areas of enemy SSBN patrols.
58Dotsenko, "Soviet Art of Naval Warfare."
59Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, "Prepare Yourself for Modern Warfare," Morskoy Sbornik, 1989, no.
1.
60See Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy,"
Orbis, Fall 1983, pp.695-739.
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For a number of reasons, this mission is incompatible with Gorbachev's "new
thinking." The "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" aims at damage limitation, which
contradicts Gorbachev's assertions about unwinnability of nuclear war.61 This reflects the
traditionalist thinking of top Soviet military officers. One of the better informed domestic
critics of the Soviet defense establishment has hinted that the military establishment tends to
view Gorbachev's pronouncements on unwinnability of nuclear war as propaganda strictly
for consumption abroad:
It is evidendy not only to the peace-loving foreign public, the
Palme Commission or the Delhi Six that these words
[Gorbachev's statement that there could be no defense
against nuclear weapons] apply to. Surely statements by the
head of our state and our Defence Council give a strategic
guidance to all the military agencies involved.62
The "new thinkers" have pointed out that the "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" is
also expensive beyond the means of today 's and tomorrow 's Soviet economy, as this
mission requires a large number of ASW groups on station at all times throughout the
world oceans.63 Not only the civilian analysts are critical of the costs involved in building
up a large blue water navy-the First Deputy Chief of General Staff, Army General Lobov,
has expressed concern about the damage done by excessive spending on such a navy to the
more crucial needs of ground forces.64 (Establishing how many ships will be necessary
for the Soviets to accomplish the "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" will require some
sophisticated simulation.)
The political underpinnings of this mission are hardly out of the "new thinking"
arsenal: the emphasis on constant readiness against massive nuclear surprise attack from the
61RADM Thomas A. Brooks, ""A Nuclear War-Fighting Treatise," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May
1989, p.138..
62Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" p. 38.
63Ibid., pp. 41, 42.MA. A. Kokoshin, V. N. Lobov "Predvidenie," p. 176.
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enemy (obv ously , the United States) suggests that the two suj >erpowers are politically (and
therefore, militarily) in a sharp conflict. This assumption is still popular among at least
some high-ranking military officers who criticize Gorbachev's national security policies.
Among the sharpest critics is Adm. Gennadiy Khvatov, Commander of the Pacific Ocean
Fleet, who has compared the current international situation of the Soviet Union to its
isolation among hostile powers in 1939! 65
The idea of attacking enemy (i. e., American) SSBNs at the outset of hostilities
suggests a political thinking which holds that the conflict between the two socio-political
system is so sharp that there will be no way to settle for less than a total victory once the
hostilities begin. This approach could be faulted, as the "new thinkers" frequently do when
it comes to the traditional national security thinking in the USSR, for an inability and
unwillingness to understand how Soviet actions will be percei /ed by the other side.
Indeed, there is no indication whatsoever in Vyunenk Vs book that its authors have
given any thought to the faci that the Americans view their SSBNs as their strategic reserve
assuring retaliation (and thus, strategic stability) if the American ICBMs are destroyed by
the first strike of Soviet ICBMs. Vyunenko and other authors seem to be unaware of or
uninterested in the possibility that the course of action they propose, if ever implemented, is
likely to provoke the release of all surviving U. S. strategic systems. This certainly runs
against the grain of the "new thinking" which postulates that the main mission of the armed
forces is to prevent a war, especially a nuclear one. Indeed, Defense Minister Yazov
recently criticized as mistaken the past approach of increasing the Soviet offensive potential
in order to prevent a war.66
The requirement to destroy enemy platforms with strategic weapons within minutes
from the beginning of hostilities contradicts Gorbachev's concern about accidental nuclear
65Stephen F >ye, "Defense Issues at the Party Congress, Report on the USSR, July 27, 1990, p. 2.
66D. Yazov, 'Novaya model' bezopasnosti i vooruzhennye sily," Kommunist, 1989, no. 18, pp. 65, 66.
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war and his insistence that politicians exercise full control over strategic forces. 67 The
extremely short time span allowed for such a decision, as well as possible communication
problems raise the specter of unsanctioned attack and of devolution of too much authority
to VMF captains at sea, which they could use, if not to attack the enemy on their own, but
to operate in an aggressive enough fashion to provoke confrontation where none was
intended by the enemy.
The incipient changes in the political structure of the Soviet Union also cast doubt
on the viability of the "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" mission. One after another the
Union Republics are claiming the right to influence defense posture and decision-making.
The latest and most significant signal of that sort came from the Ukraine, the major (after
Russian Federation) supplier of manpower and materiel for the Soviet Armed Forces. It
has declared a right to have its own army and to determine how the Ukrainian conscripts
are used outside of the Ukraine.68 The Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin intends to
have its own Minister of Defense (albeit without a ministry) to check on activities of the
USSR Ministry of Defense. These developments suggest a likely decentralization of
defense decision-making, (although Gorbachev has vehemently protested against this),69
with individual republics obtaining the right to veto certain decisions made by the USSR
President. Under such circumstances, it will be unrealistic to expect the extremely rapid
decision-making necessary for a successful "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" mission
executed at the outset of a conventional conlifct.
Some in the Soviet military have been asking for an increased authority to act in the
beginning of hostilities. For instance, an article on the lessons of World War II published
in the General Staff monthly Voennaya mysl', has proposed that commanders of
formations of troops near the borders be given "the right to take on their own the adequate
67
"Press-konferentsiya M.S. Goibacheva, Izvestiya, November 22, 1985.
68RFE/RL, Daily Report, no. 1' 4, October 11, 1990.
69
"Rech' M. G( rbacheva pered < fitserami," p. 10.
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measures when the enemy raises combat readiness of his forces," because it is allegedly
very difficult to distinguish between large-scale NATO exercises and preparation for an
invasion.70
It is noteworthy that then CNO Adm. Carlisle Trost, when addressing Soviet naval
officers, was asked a specific question on the alleged problem of distinguishing between
exercises and an attack. 71 It is also of interest that the VMF was the only military service in
the Soviet Union not caught completely by surprise by the German attack on June 22,
1941—thanks to their C-in-C disobeying the politicians, and using his own judgement to
increase combat readiness, which is remembered and now praised by the Soviet military
establishment.72
The "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" mission appears to contradict not only the
"new thinking," but also some important ideas voiced by the Soviet military establishment
itself even before Gorbachev's coming to power. The most notable example was the
statement by then Chief of General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov made in 1984 that the
proliferation and variety of nuclear armed systems in the arsenals of the superpowers
makes a disarming first strike futile, as enough systems are bound to survive it in order to
deliver an unacceptable damage in retaliation. 73
As mentioned earlier, the 1979 edition of Adm. Gorshkov's Sea Power of the State
clearly listed the mission of destruction of enemy sea-born nuclear weapons capable of
reaching the Soviet homeland as part of the Fleet Versus Shore mission.74 The "Repulsion
of Aerospace Attack" mission, however, is described as the heir of "the traditional naval
mission—destruction of enemy fleet.". Its ancestor is described as the general naval battle,
70Col. A. D. Borshchov, "Otrazhenie fashistskoy agressii: uroki i vyvody," Voennaya mysl', 1990, no. 3,
p. 22.
71
"Admiral K. Trost daet otvety," Morskoy sbornik, 1990, no. 5, p. 56.
72Lt. General V. Serebryannikoy, "Sootnoshenie politicheskikh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite
sotisalizma," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, 1987, no. 18, pp. 12, 13.
73
"The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day," Krasnya zvezda, May 9, 1984,
translated in FBIS-Soviet Union, May 9, 1984, p. R19.
74Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch' j osudarstva , p. 329.
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which has found its modern incarnation in "decisive direct struggle of fleets armed with
nuclear missiles and emphasizing submarines and aircraft in the first operations of the initial
period of war."75 In a somewhat similar manner, Adm. Chernavin referred to the
"independent" character of such a mission, and emphasized the "naval battle" as "the
principal method of winning victory over the enemy."76
The Soviet naval tradition is biased towards a combined arms approach. The Soviet
Navy's greatest contribution has been traditionally seen as facilitating the operations of
ground forces designed to seize enemy territory, the ultimate requirement for victory for a
great land power. Indeed, VMF does not have its own strategy; it is utilized within the
context of the general military strategy of the Soviet Union. Following this tradition, Adm.
Gorshkov in 1979 viewed independent Fleet-Against-Fleet operations as gradually losing
their primacy to Fleet-Against-Shore operations. The latter embraced destruction of enemy
military and economic targets on land, and therefore included defense of friendly and
suppression of enemy sea-based platforms of strategic nuclear systems.77
If VMF's main mission is against the shore, then all naval policies (weapons
acquisition, personnel, planning, etc.) have to be reasonably closely coordinated with the
policies of the other services and the General Staff. Asserting that the main mission of
VMF is that of Fleet-Against-Fleet and that it goes back to the grand tradition of a general
battle for command of the sea would mean greater independence for the Navy as a
bureaucracy. It was typical of various bureaucratic agencies during the Brezhnev era to
seek immunity from centralized policy-making in pursuit of their corporate self-interest, an
important condition for bureaucratic growth at the times of economic decline. It appears
that at least some elements in the VMF command attempted to use the "Repulsion of
Aerospace Attack" mission as an instrument for gaining a measure of such an immunity.
75Vyunenko et al., Voenno-mor koy flot, p.221.
76Chernayin, "Prepare Yourself i >r Modem Warfare," p. ???????
77Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch' >osudarstva
, pp. 323-330.
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This would be incompatible with Gorbachev's emphasis on economizing and on civilian
intervention in military planning.78
The "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" mission seems to be the product of the
traditional war-fighting mentality of the Soviet military, as well as of specific political
circumstances of the early- to mid-1980s. (Given the slow tempo of Soviet publishing
industry and research activities, for Vyunenko's book to be ready for publication in early
1987, its manuscript must have been finished by the mid- 1986 at the latest, its writing
probably must have taken place between 1984 and 1986, and the basic ideas for it must
have been formulated between 1982 and 1984.) At that time, the ageing Kremlin
oligarchies apparently succumbed to the war hysteria which they themselves had unleashed
to stop the deployment of American INF forces in Western Europe. According to the
former chief of the KGB station in London, Oleg Gordievsky, the Soviet leadership was
seriously concerned about the possibility of a surprise attack by NATO, a concern
heightened by their fear that the warheads of Pershing 2 missiles could penetrate their
underground command bunkers. In Gordievsky's judgment, the Soviet leaders' ignorance
of the outside world, narrow-mindedness induced by the Communist ideology, and
resulting mirror-imaging were responsible for such a distorted vision.79
Under such circumstances, the military might have been tasked with finding all
ways possible to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear strike against the Soviet command
and control centers. The special role for the navy in that undertaking was probably due to
the actual (C-4) and planned (D-5) deployments of American SLBM's with substantial (C-
4) and high (D-5) hard target kill capabilities. There are some indications that at least until
very recently the VMF was to attack enemy nuclear weapons platforms at the outset of
hostilities. In a newspaper interview, a skipper of a Soviet nuclear submarine described his
78Such an approach, it should he noted, would also contradict the point made in the another chapter of
Vyunenko's book that the joint character of military operations is likely to increase, and service
independence will decline furthe ; see Vyunenko N.P. et al., Voenno-morskoy flot
,
p. 35.
7901eg Gordievsky, "Pershing P iranoia in the Kremlin," The Times, Fe iruary 27, 1990.
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task as follows: "Every minute hundreds of foreign nuclear missiles are targeted on the
USSR. ... Our mission is to neutralize them at the critical moment."80 Now that
Gorbachev has proclaimed the end of the "cold war" and the absurdity of any preparations
for fighting a nuclear war, the "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" mission must have no or
minimal political foundation.
Whatever plans might have been developed by the VMF for the future, the reality
until now has been that the wartime Soviet strategic ASW capability has been quite limited
because of an absence of a viable open ocean air support and other technical factors. The
crisis condition of the Soviet economy today and in the foreseeable future appears to
preclude a very expensive program (apparently, such as enyisioned by Vyunenko and his
authors) needed to give the Soviets such a capability.
To sum it up, the "Repulsion of Aerospace Attack" mission for VMF was rooted in
the traditional Soviet military-political thinking as well as in the specific political
circumstances which immediately preceded Gorbachev's ascendance. Political changes
introduced by Gorbachev, the resulting revisions in military doctrine, and the economic
realities are likely to make this mission obsolete (with the possible exception of extended air
defense against ALCM's and SLCM's)81 even before it can affect the overall posture and
composition of VMF.
80S. Taranov, "Moryak, podvod lik, komandir," Izvestiya,.July, 31, 1988.
°Mam indebted to Capt. Normal Channell for pointing out to me the importance of extended air defense
against cruise missiles.
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Suppression of Enemy Military-Economic Potential.
Vyunenko's book lumps several missions together under this rubric:
• Strikes by sea-based strategic systems, mostly SLBMs and SLCMs, against enemy
industrial and political centers, naval facilities, command and control facilities and other
strategic targets.82
• SLOC interdiction.
• Interference with the extraction of energy and raw material resources from the sea bed.
Strikes By Sea-Based Strategic Systems Against Enemy Land Targets.
SLBM/SLCM strikes against enemy territory are generally consistent with the idea
of maintaining a retaliatory capability deterring the potential aggressor from a first use of
nuclear weapons, a concept compatible with the "new thinking" and defensive strategy.
There appears to be a consensus among both military and civilian analysts in the Soviet
Union that doing away with nuclear deterrence is Utopian for the foreseeable future.
(Gorbachev's proposal for a complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 is now
ignored by most Soviets writing on the subject as unrealistic; only some military officers
refer to it in order to prove the perfidy of the West, which has not agreed to it.)
Nevertheless, there are substantial differences between the traditional approach to this
mission and the "new thinking." When it comes to nuclear forces, a seasoned observer of
Soviet military affairs points to two crucial issues in the debate:
The first is whether "military-strategic" (nuclear) parity with
the West should continue to be maintained on a
"quantitative" basis or be redefined on a "qualitative" basis.
82Vyunenko et al., Voenno-mot <koy flot, p. 236.
34
The former relies on parity in numbers of strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles and warheads, while the latter relies on
parity in ensuring the infliction of an unacceptably damaging
second strike. A second but closely related issue involves
whether counter-force or counter-value targeting should
define future military requirements. 83
These issues have become a subject of a rather venomous argument between civilian
analysts suggesting that the USSR could exercise deterrence through vastly and even
unilaterally reduced counter-value military arsenals, with military analysts arguing the
opposite.84
The approach to be chosen depends essentially on political factors. At issue again is
the threat assessment and the political perception of the U. S. and other nuclear powers,
which will determine the target selection and requirements for the Soviet strategic offensive
forces, including their sea-based elements. The "new thinkers" argue that a relatively small
fraction of available strategic arsenals (from 5 to 400 warheads) will be sufficient retaliation
if they can attack major urban areas of the U. S. This argument is based on a political
assessment of the U.S. as a democracy unwilling to contemplate even a minimum damage
from a retaliatory strike and capable of restraining the more aggressive elements in its own
political-military elite.85
The counter argument of the military is, to use the terminology of Soviet military
science, mostly military-technical, but it has an underlying socio-political message of its
own. It measures the requirements for Soviet nuclear forces with reference to various
"worst case" scenarios, and concludes that only a rough numerical parity with the U.S.
(and other nuclear powers in case of very deep cuts) can insure Soviet security. In fact,
83William E. Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," Problems of Communism, May-June 1990, p.
56.
84See, for instance, Ye. Volkov, "Ne raz"yasnyaet a zatumanivaet," Krasnaya zvezda, September 28, 1989;
Ye. Volkov, "V predelakh razumnoi dostatochnosti," Krasnaya zvezda, November 30, 1989; I. Malashenko,
"Paritet vchera i segodnya," Moskovskie novosti, no. 31, July 30, 1989.
85See, for instance, Radomir Bogdanov, Andrei Kortunov, '"Minimal'noe sderzhivanie': utopiya ill real'naya
perspektiva," Moskovksie novosti, June 4, 1989; A. Nuykin, "O boegolovkakh, dobre i professionalizme,"
Moskovksie novosti, July 30, 1989; Malashenko, "Paritet vchera i segodnya;" Arbatov, "How Much
Defence Is Sufficient?" p. 36.
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this is the old approach of achieving robust deterrence through maximizing the warfighting
capability of the Soviet strategic offensive forces. The implied socio-political message is
what Gen. Vladimir Lobov and Dr. Andrei Kokoshin described as a typical Soviet
delusion:
When evaluating the military-political situation in the world,
we are are far from taking fully into account the fact that
today's bourgeois-democratic regimes in the major capitalist
states, even when they have conservative governments, are
sharply different from the extreme right regimes like the ones
of Hitler and Mussolini. Until now some of our scholars,
when estimating the probability of war, practically ignore
these qualitative changes and the impact of World War II
on the social consciousness in the majority of developed
capitalist nations. 86 [Emphasis added.]
In other words, the Western leaders are unlikely to do anything that can result even in a
very limited use of nuclear weapons against their nations, because their societies have a
much lower threshold of pain tolerance than the Soviet military planners, obsessed with
their World War II examples, tend to ascribe to them.
This argument has a direct bearing on the mission broadly described as strikes by
sea-based strategic systems against various enemy land targets. The scenarios for such
strikes found in Vyunenko's book appear to conflict with the "new thinking" in several
ways. The target set proposed in Vyunenko's book includes enemy industrial and political
centers, naval facilities, command and control facilities and other strategic targets.87 While
targeting industrial and political centers is compatible with the concept of retaliation in the
"new thinking," the requirement to attack naval facilities is typical of damage limitation and
war-fighting, and therefore unnecessary if "new thinking" is implemented. The same goes
for the destruction of enemy command and control facilities, with the additional
86Kokoshin, Lobov, "Predviden c," p. 182.
87Vyunenko et al., Voenno-moi koyflot, p. 236.
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disadvantage of making war termination before the release of practically all strategic
systems unlikely.
The large target set proposed by VMF requires that Soviet SSBNs with "medium-
range" ballistic missiles, SSGN's and SSG's get within firing range from the enemy
landmass (apparently North America, since the Soviets talk about the need for "lengthy
passages" and for "overcoming ASW barriers.")88 This may have several implications
unwelcome from the point of view of "new thinking." First and foremost, there is the
problem of command and control. As Vyunenko's book has it,
Strategic weapons platforms are usually deployed to distant
areas where the enemy as a rule has great opportunities for
achieving superiority in power supply for radio-electronic
suppression of communications. 89
It would take some time, according to Vyunenko, for the command for the release of
SLBMs and SLCMs to be received by submarines, which would also require additional
time for deploying to launching positions, getting close to the surface in order to
communicate, avoiding enemy ASW forces, and preparing for launching. So,
In order to provide for a simultaneous strike by the
maximum number of submarines, the nuclear weapons
release command should be given to them far in
advance of the designated launch time.90 [Emphasis
added]
This contradicts Gorbachev's stated objective of eliminating the possibility of an accidental





the political leaders lock themselves into an irrevocable decision to use nuclear weapons,
and makes SSBN's more suitable as strategic reserve.91
Th i; character of deployment of SSBNs proposed by the VMF in Vyunenko's book
(wide dispersal throughout the oceans) may also contradict some important political and
technical -ealities. Keeping SSBN's close to home waters in bastions allows for their
better support and security, improved C3, and shorter transit time to launch stations.92 In
addition, having Soviet submarines carrying strategic weapons roaming on patrols far away
from home today has an increased potential for political embarrassment as a minimum, and
a catastrophe as a maximum. The Soviet government is hardly eager to see another SSBN
of theirs disabled near the American shores. It would be not only bad political
advertisement and an untimely reminder to the American public of the Soviet nuclear threat,
but might also result in the U.S. learning more about the Soviet subs than the Soviet would
like them to know. Even more grave is the potential for a mutiny or some other form of a
disciplinary failure on board. Addressing the problems of the Soviet manpower in 1989,
Gorbachev expressed concern about the poor discipline of servicemen who have access to
weapons of mass destruction.93 Given the current social tensions in general, low morale
among both commissioned officers and enlisted men, atmosphere charged with ethnic
violence, and the tradition of mutinies from the battleship Potemkin in 1905 to the
Storozhevoy destroyer in 1975, a certain prudence would dictate a posture minimizing
distant patrols by SSBNs
,
SSGNs and SSGs. It is safer to keep them closer to home,
where crews would not be subjected to the pressure of long cruises and where a mutiny
could be quickly suppressed.
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Th s is essentially a posture recommended by Alexei Arbatov:
To reinforce land-based missile forces, it would apparently
be enough for us to have one new long-range submarine
missile system capable of hitting targets from near the Soviet
coast and hence making it unnecessary to venture on to the
high seas though enemy anti-submarine barriers. In the case
of lower SOF [strategic offensive forces] levels, the Delta-4
submarine, which carrier 16 SS-N-23 missiles tipped with
64 warheads in all, would apparently be more attractive than
Typhoon with its 200 warheads mounted on 20 SS-N-20
missiles. The former makes it possible within the limits of
the same number of warheads to distribute forces over a
greater number of launching positions than the latter, thereby
adding to the survivability of our missile carrying submarine
fleet.94
There is a glaring discrepancy between the the traditional approach of VMF to the
employment of its strategic systems, and the proposals advanced under the "new thinking"
umbrella. Vyunenko's book proposes a counterforce first strike against the most time-
urgent targets by sea-based strategic systems, carried out together with other components
of the strategic forces. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of a retaliatory
strikes against not time-urgent targets, a definition apparently emphasizing countervalue
targets.95 More recent VMF pronouncements on the subjects are ambiguous. Thus, a
1989 Morskoy sbornik article lists as the first mission of the navy for the perestroika era
"delivering retaliatory and surprise counterblows against the enemy..."96 Surely,
retaliatory countervalue strikes can hardly be described as a "surprise"! This formulation
appears to be a way out for VMF to preserve a counterforce option for a warfighting
scenario.
94Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" p. 37.
95Vyunenko et al., Voenno-mvrskoy flot, p. 242, 243.
96Dotsenko, "Soviet Art of Na> al Warfare."
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Rec onciliation of the counterforce/countervalue deterrence-through-warfighting
scenarios with deterrence-through-minimum-countervalue-strikes scenarios will not be a
simple process on a policy-making level. Shocking as the denunciations of the
counterforce mission by the "new thinkers" might be to the VMF, these civilian academics'
only influence (in the absence of any real public pressure on the military in "military-
technical" aspects via the Supreme Soviet) on the Navy might be only by getting the top
political leadership, primarily Gorbachev, on their side. It is a rather technical issue of little
concern to the public, and it is not clear at all that it is high enough on Gorbachev's agenda
to put his political weight behind it now. After all, there is no immediate political price to
pay if VMF continues with the traditionally defined counterforce mission. Given the
apparent confusion in all policy areas in the USSR, the military's openly expressed
discontent with many aspects of Gorbachev's perestroika and "new thinking," their
continuing protests against the decision to recognize the ABM LPAR near Krasnoyarsk as a
violation cf the ABM Treaty,97 it is unlikely that a thorough wholesale revision of the
SSBNs and SSGNs targeting has been already undertaken and implemented.
The economic pressures and considerations of safety and improved command and
control are more likely to have already had an impact on how the mission of strikes against
enemy mil taiy-econorruc-administrative targets is operationally implemented now as far as
the patterns of deployment of the submarine fleet are concerned. The real change in this
mission is probably still in the future, if the economic pressures drastically reduce the
Navy's slice in the military pie, an eventuality pointed to rather directly by Dr. Andrei
Kokoshin and General Vladimir Lobov.98 Only then can a reduction of Soviet submarine
fleet through retirement of old platforms with little to no replacement by the new ones result
97See John W. R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Early Warning Radars, Debated," Report on the USSR, August 17,
1990, pp. 14, 15.
98A. A. Kokoshin, V. N. Lobe v, "Predvidenie," p. 176.
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in a certain adoption of a countervalue posture for the Soviet sea-based strategic weapons
systems—simply because there would be not enough of them for a counterforce one.
Pa: sage of time is also likely to contribute to a change in the Soviet posture in the
direction c f the "new thinking," as the generation of senior officers retires and a new one
takes over. There are signs that many junior and middle ranking officers today are
becoming increasingly opposed to the Marxist-Leninist political orthodoxy. An analysis of
the voting patterns of military deputies to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies has
shown that while senior officers cast only 16 percent of their votes for the reformist
"Democratic Russia" bloc, and 82 percent of their votes were cast against, "among the
middle-level ... officers the figure is 63 percent (37 percent against), and among junior
officers — 73 percent (22 percent against).99 It is reasonable to expect that among the new
generation of VMF commanders the attachment to nuclear warfighting formulas, derived
from the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, will be much weaker than in those in charge of VMF
today.
SLOC interdiction.
Another mission grouped under the umbrella of "Suppression of Enemy Military-
Economic Potential" is SLOC interdiction. It was described as a strategically important
element of the "Fleet Against Shore" mission by Adm. Gorshkov in the 1970's. 100 SLOC
interdiction was given a prominent place in Soviet naval exercises in the 1970s, including
Okean 75. 101 A recent Soviet book on defense economics has described it as especially
99Julia Wishnevsky, "The Two Sides of the Barricades in Russian Politics Today," Report on the USSR,
August 24, 1990, p. 17.
'^Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva, p. 329.
101 Daniel, "Trends and Patterns in Major Soviet Naval Exercises," pp. '27, 228.
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important because of NATO's dependence on SLOC for crucial supplies. 102 Vyunenko's
book also pays considerable attention to SLOC interdiction, although it clearly ranks them
below the missions described earlier. 103 An additional boost to this mission's prominence
has been given by the disclosure that Adm. Chernavin has written a book entitled The
Struggle on Sea Lines of Communications: the Lessons of Past Wars and Today, and by
publication of selections from it in the Morskoy sbornik. 104
Chernavin's choice of SLOC interdiction as a topic for a book, which is bound to
be read as the C-in-C's manifesto, suggests that as far as the VMF command is concerned,
this mission is coming to receive a higher priority, probably because it is easier to fit SLOC
interdiction within the framework of defensive military strategy than "Repulsion of
Aerospace Attack;" it also seems to be less controversial than the mission of strikes against
enemy military-industrial targets with its conflict between the countervalue and counterforce
scenarios. Chernavin says that in case of a protracted war SLOC interdiction will be the
main component of the armed struggle at sea. 105 He maintains that SLOC interdiction
mission is fully compatible with the defensive strategy:
One of the defensive missions which the VMF can solve in a
war forced upon us, would be the struggle for ocean and sea
lines of communications, which are of great importance for
functioning of the economy, transportation of troops,
military equipment, fuel and other materiel to the continental
military theaters, without which the major imperialist powers
would be unable to conduct successful operations on land
fronts. 106
102Col. S. A. Bartenev, Ekonomicheskoe protivoborstvo v voyne (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), p.141.
103Vyunenko et al., Voenno-morskoy flot, pp. 244-249.
104Adm. V. Chernavin, "Bor'ba na kommunikatsiyakh: uroki voyn i sovremennost'," Morskoy sbornik,
January 1990, pp. 18-28, February 1990, pp. 29-40.





But the "new thinkers" consider SLOC interdiction as conceived by Chernavin to be
incompatible with the defensive strategy. 107 Indeed, Chernavin says that "effective" SLOC
interdiction dictates the necessity of "massive strikes against the shipbuilding centers and
ports. Thi ; would inevitably lead to an escalation." 108 This, of course, would defeat the
whole purpose of the defensive military strategy-avoid destructive and pointless nuclear
warfighting. The context of Chernavin's statement makes it quite clear that he meant it to
be a rebuttil to the proponents of defensive strategy. He accuses NATO of harboring plans
for "offensive operations" and even "preventive measures" against the USSR~a traditional
view at variance with the political premises of the "new thinking." The Soviet military
doctrine is defensive, according to Chernavin, because the Soviet Armed Forces will never
be used "for aggressive purposes"—the traditional way of avoiding a discussion of the
offensive r ature of Soviet military strategy. Reasonable sufficiency and defensive doctrine
for the VMF, the C-in-C continues, can be achieved only in the course of naval arms
control and confidence-building measures. 109 Since Chernavin knows that both ideas are
unacceptable to the U.S., and that recently some "new thinkers" have been dismissing the
concept of parity between the U.S. and USSR as unnecessary and unaffordable, his
pronounce nents can be read as a statement of disagreement with the defensive strategy and
reasonable sufficiency, and an attempt to torpedo their implementation by insistence on
naval arms control with the U.S.
A gradual reconciliation of the traditional naval views and the "new thinking" on the
subject of SLOC interdiction is possible in the future. The political changes unfolding
today in Europe can help to remove the offensive edge from the SLOC interdiction mission
by eliminating the probability of a Soviet-American war in Europe. The impossibility of
such a war is obvious to the "new thinkers," but the Soviet military high command
107Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" p. 41,




continues to stick to its traditional views pending a drastic reduction in NATO capabilities
and an establishment of an all-encompassing new European security system, a development
which is still years ahead. There is possible disagreement between the naval traditionalists
and the "new thinkers" when it comes to the composition of forces required for SLOC
interdiction. Chernavin regards submarines and aviation as crucial for this mission. 110
The "new thinkers," following in the steps of the "young school" of the 1920's, view
submarines and aircraft positively because they are well suited for the defense of the Soviet
coast line, as opposed to large surface blue-water combatants. 111 But if Chernavin implies
the need for carrier-based aviation for SLOC interdiction, such a view is bound to meet
with resistance of the "new thinkers." (On "new thinking" and aircraft carriers, see
below.)
If the Soviet Navy is not to interdict SLOC in the Atlantic, what other contingencies
for SLOC interdiction are there? Situations like the current Persian Gulf crisis might
provide a model for future SLOC interdiction mission for the VMF, especially in view of
expectations both among some "new thinkers" and naval officers (as discussed earlier) that
the growth of Third World regional powers presents one of the important threats to future
security and stability. There is a general agreement among both the conservative and liberal
segments of the Soviet/Russian elite that their nation should not relinquish its great power
status, with the difference that the conservatives have a unilateralist approach close to that
traditionally pursued by the Kremlin, while the liberals want the Soviet Union to discharge
its great power military responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council and within the framework of the UN. 112 (We should not discount,
however, a different approach recently formulated by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who has
110Ibid., p. 35.
^Arbatov, "How Much Defem ; Is Sufficient?" p. 42; Kokoshin, Lobov, "Predvidenie,"p. 176.
112For libe al views, see Andrei Kortunov, "Vneshnyaya politika: pre* olzhenie diskussii," Kommuist, no.
12, August 1990, p. 116.
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appealed to the Russians to mind their own business and in effect turn isolationist) 113 The
second approach is clearly related to the situations like the current naval blockade of Iraq
(the Soviets view naval blockade as a special case of SLOC interdiction)114 . There are so
far no putative requirements for Soviet participation in such a SLOC interdiction mission; if
and when they come, these requirements are likely to be much more modest that the ones
for SLOC interdiction in a Soviet-American global confrontation.
Destruction of Groupings of Enemy Armed Forces.
In Vyunenko's book two missions are in effect put under the same umbrella of
Destruction of Groupings of Enemy Armed Forces: that of cooperation with the other
services in combat against enemy ground forces, a mission traditionally assigned to the
Soviet Navy, and that of achieving command of the sea. 115 Compared to Adm.
Gorshkov's pronouncements made 10 years earlier, the emphasis on sea control as a
necessary adjunct to support for ground operations has been somewhat strengthened. 116
The impact of politics on this mission depends both on interpretations of the defensive
strategy and on future geopolitical developments. There are no reasons to doubt that the
mission of direct support for ground operations will remain: it was not eliminated even
during the worst days of VMF in the 1920s to mid- 1930s. It is difficult, however, to
predict how the VMF will be configured to carry out such a mission in the European TVDs
in view of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and in the event of effective removal of the
Ukraine, Moldavia and the Baltic republics from the Soviet national security system. (Such
an assessment will be undertaken in the course of the subsequent research project.) But
113Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Kak nam obustroit' Rossiyu? (Paris: YMCA Press, 1990), passim.
114Vyunenko et a\.,Voenno-morskoy flot, p. 248.
u5Ibid., pp. 250, 261, 262.
116Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch' gosudarstv, p.
45
one has re isons to doubt that Vyunenko's suggestion that support of ground operations
requires sea control, or at least its limited version (temporary sea control in a sector of an
oceanic TVD) 117 will become more than merely a wish.
Exi ending the battle thousands of miles from the Soviet shores can be escalatory.
The Soviei naval leaders have been unwilling so far to recognize the basic asymmetry of
Soviet and American national interests. The Soviet Union, largely self-sufficient in natural
resources, and now without any overseas allies (Cuba hardly counts as one now), simply
does not have vital interests far away from its shores. ((The current Soviet dependence on
food imports is a different matter, because these imports come from the same Western
nations that the Soviet military doctrine continues to identify as potential enemies; to deny
food to the Soviets, these nations need no recourse to SLOC interdiction.) Not so with the
United States, which continues to have global economic and political interests, as clearly
demonstrated by the current Persian Gulf crisis. "New thinkers" are likely to argue that
any attempt to fight the U.S. Navy in waters not contiguous to the Soviet Union, will
constitute unnecessary horizontal escalation, will only prevent localization and containment
of a conflict, and as such will contradict the defensive strategy.
Even more important for the eventual fate of this mission will be the issue of air
support. High ranking VMF officers insist that aircraft carriers will play a key role in any
future war, especially a conventional one. 118 As Adm. Chernavin indicated, in the Soviet
view, operations of surface groups far away from the friendly shore are impossible without
air cover provided by aircraft carriers. 119 But the Soviet aircraft carrier program, which
involves building three "real" Tbilisi-class carriers is now a highly charged political issue.
The "new thinkers" have denounced the carriers as incompatible with the defensive
117Vyunenko et al., Voenno-morskoy flot, p. 262.
118Adm. V. Ponikarovskiy, Capt. 1st Rank O. Mrykin (Ret.), "Poteri avianostsev vo Vtoroy mirovoy
voyne, Morskoy sbornik, no. 7, 1990, .p. 28.
119
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problems, see Captain 1st Rank A. Bobrakov, "Ot neznakomstva s potrebnostyami voyny," Morskoy
sbornik, 1990, no. 6, p. 5.
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strategy. The Tbilisi-class carriers, they argue, if deployed where needed most, i.e., in the
Barentz Sea and the Sea of Japan, will be threatening to Scandinavia and Japan. Their
existence itself "attests to the fact the Soviet naval strategy remains oriented to the
possibility of a sustained non-nuclear large-scale naval conflict," which contradicts the
defensive strategy's dictum that a major conventional "conflict will inevitably grow into a
nuclear war." 120 Other civilian analysts conclude that the Soviet Union is economically
incapable of competing with the U.S both in the number of aircraft carriers and in the skills
needed to operate them, and therefore should not waste resources on a carrier program. 121
The real Soviet strength, maintains another academic specialist, is in attack submarines,
"land-based missile-carrying naval aircraft, small ships and boats for coastal operations,"
and concludes, with a reference to the Brookings Institution's William W. Kaufmann (a
prominent analyst who is skeptical of U.S. naval capabilities) that these Soviet forces will
be enough to sink "all NATO aircraft carriers operating off [the Soviet] coast." 122
Some influential Ground Forces officers also have doubts about the Soviet aircraft
carriers. First Deputy Chief of General Staff Army Gen. V. Lobov, without directly
attacking the carrier program, has described the last Tsar's and Stalin's attempts to build
expensive ocean-going navies as a dangerous waste of resources, which should have been
spent on the ground forces, crucial for Russia/USSR's defense. 123 Major Gen. Kirilenko,
who has engaged civilian analysts in a heated polemic about reasonable sufficiency, has
implicitly disavowed the aircraft carriers program, saying that the current leadership of the
Ministry of Defense is not responsible for decisions taken more than 10 years ago. 124
120Andrei Kortunov, Igor Malashenko, "'Tbilisi,' "Riga' and the rest?" New Times, 1989, no. 51, p. 27.
121 G. Sturm, "Nuzhny li nam 'avianostsy'," Moskovskie novosti, January 28, 1990; Blagovolin,
"Geopolitichcskie aspekty oboronitel'noy dostatochnosti," reproduced ii USSR Today. Soviet Media News
and Features Digest,, March 20, 1990, p. 33.
122Arbatov, 'How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" p. 42.
123A. A. Ko<oshin, V. N. Lobov, "Predvidenie," pp. 175, 176.
124V. Zabro lin, "Zabota o bez ipasnosti ilL.o snizhenii bezopasnosti "" Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,
1990. no. !1, p. 43.
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Thore has been no open criticism of the Tbilisi class carrier program in the VMF,
but there are indications of muted dissent there. In an article published by Morskoy
sbornik in 1988, a Vice Admiral and two Captains 1st Rank praised the modest naval
program of the 1920s, oriented towards coastal defense and based on a realistic assessment
of the nation's economic capabilities, and criticized the attempts made in the 1930s to
achieve a quantitative parity with the potential enemy's navy. This program included
construction of battleships and heavy cruisers, and design of two aircraft carriers, an effort
that "consjmed substantial resources," and had to be scrapped in 1940 in view of an
imminent German attack. Moreover, the ships were built without "a clear understanding of
their mission." The authors recommend that today's VMF pays more attention to
fashioning its forces for realistic missions, and to providing them with requisite logistics
instead of buying new ships for their own sake. 125 It is quite probable that the authors had
in mind, among other things, the Tbilisi-class carriers: very expensive ships, whose
construction was approved in 1976 at the peak of Soviet global ambitions, when America
appeared unable to recover from the defeat in Vietnam and Watergate, but which seem
rather out of place in today's Soviet economic conditions and retreat even in Eastern
Europe. Indeed, it appears that the VMF has been very poorly prepared for handling such
complex ships as aircraft carriers. 126 Thus, the future of the aircraft carriers and therefore
of the Soviet ability to fight for sea control away from their coastal waters is in doubt.
125R. Golosov, V. Koryavko, E. Shevelev, "Nekotorye uroki iz sozdaniya otechestvennogo flota,'
Morskoy sbornik, 1988, no. 7, pa 24-26.
126Yu. Gladkevich, "Na puti k o eanu," Krasnaya zvezda, April 26, 19 (H).
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Navy in Regional Conflicts.
The build-up of the Soviet surface navy of the late 1960's-1970's coincided with
the growing Soviet involvement in the Third World conflicts. (See above on on Adm.
Gorshkov's pronouncements regarding the navy's special role in promoting the interests of
the Soviet state world-wide ) Aid to the Third World "national-liberation" and other leftist
movements continued to be described as an important mission for the Soviet Armed Forces
as late as 1 )S1. 121 Since that time, however, the idea of military involvement in the Third
World has been under consistent attack from the "new thinkers." After returning from a
tour of Angola and Mozambique, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze described these Soviet
Third World allies as having "the largest and best armed military forces in the region and
the most shocking poverty, " and denounced the Soviet military aid to these nations as "the
policy of pseudosupport." 1 -8 Some in the Soviet military have begun to say that it is both
necessary and possible to resolve Third World conflicts through negotiations and
mediation, without recourse to military force or threats of its use. 129 Alexei Arbatov has
directly adc'ressed the role of the Soviet Navy in the Third World conflicts:
the extension of naval confrontation with the United States
... in conflict areas involving developing countries—the
Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, the
South Atlantic-is for objective geostrategic reasons the most
disadvantageous sphere of rivalry for [the Soviet
Union], ...having no direct bearing on the security of the
Soviet Union... 130
Some of the "new thinkers" are beginning to show interest in geopolitics, in
Russia's unique role in providing stability for the "world island" of Eurasia, and in
* 2
'Krishin el al., Politicheskoe : oderzhanie sovremcnnykh voyn, p. 164.
128Shevardnadze, "Konsolidatsh a KPSS."
129See Col. B. V. Molostov, ' tazblokirovanie krizisnykh situatsiy," Voennaya mysl', 1990, no. 6, pp.
62-70
130Arbatov, "How Much Defen Is Sufficient?" p. 42.
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understanding the past and future of Soviet/Russian—American relations in terms of
domination of the Eurasian Heartland by Russia as a natural land power, and the
domination of the Eurasian continental edge (the Rimland) by the natural maritime power,
the United States. 131 It follows from this argument that Moscow's preoccupation should
be with the Eurasian security, while the high seas and exotic nations across them should be
left to the Americans to manage, if they wish to do so. For "new thinkers," the only
justification for naval presence in the Third World is to provide C3 facilities for the Soviet
SSBNs. 132
The usual conservative opponents of the "new thinking" are split when it comes to
the Third World involvements and the VMF role in them. Many conservative Russian
nationalists, although suspicious of the West, full of admiration of the military as a true
Russian national institution, and loathing the "new thinkers," nevertheless see the military
and other aid to various Third World regimes as a waste of resources which Russia so
desperately needs—and thus implicitly agree with the "new thinkers." 133 Even the most
blatant ideologists of the Soviet military might, like Karem Rash and Aleksandr
Prokhanov, do not go beyond the general lamentations about the decline of Russian naval
power and similarly general calls for its reversal. 134 The ideology, which, to use
Prokhanov's terminology, "gave birth ... to global activity in different parts of world," 135
is rapidly disintegrating, and no new intellectual framework for naval operations in the
Third World has been found yet.
131Igor Malashenko, "Russia: the Earth's Heartland," International Affairs, July 1990, pp. 47, 48.
132Andrei Kolosov, "Reappraisal of USSR Third World Policy," International Affairs, 1990, no. 5, p. 40.
133 See, for istance, the speech by Vasiliy Belov at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies,
Izvestiya, June June 2, 1989: "What is the cost of Afghanistan? What is the cost of Cuba, Nicaragua,
Ethiopia?"
134See, for instance, Karem Rash, "Okeanicheskoe myshlenie," Morskoy sbornik, 1989, no. 7, pp.3-10;
Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Na volnakh shtormovoy epokhi,: Morskoy sbornik, 1990, no. 7, pp. 3-7. About
Karem Rash, see Mikhail Tsypkin, "Karem Rash: An Ideologue of Military Power, Report on the USSR,
vol. 2, no. 31, pp. 8-11.®
135Prokhanov, "Na volnakh shtormovoy epokhi," p. 3.
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A success or failure of the current American-led international effort against Iraq will
undoubtedly have an impact on the Soviet views concerning the use of VMF in Third
World conflicts. A victory for the international coalition is likely to strengthen the hand of
those arguing in favor of Soviet participation in the UN-sponsored "police" operations in
the Third vVorld, and might convince the VMF command to support such operations. A
defeat (or i failure to use the huge Western military presence in the Persian Gulf to achieve
Iraq's peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait) would have a polarizing impact on the Soviet
thinking: on the one hand, it would strengthen the argument that the use of force by
superpowers on a large scale is bound to be fruitless; on the other hand, it might strengthen
the argument that supporting Third World radicals against the West is not such a bad
proposition after all, since the former may come out as the winners.
CONCLUSIONS.
What will be the cumulative impact on the VMF missions of the "new thinking,"
rising politics of Russian nationalism and the political clout of the military-industrial
complex? The military-industrial complex is still a significant factor in the Soviet political
equation. The military, as the top brass like to point out these days, are now the major
instrumen\ of keeping the Soviet empire together. 136 The defense industry, according to
member of the Presidential Council Aleksandr Yakovlev, has still preserved, despite the
economic crisis, its privileged position in the Soviet economy and is strongly resisting
reforms. 1 - 7 But the military-industrial complex, just like any other sector of the Soviet
socio-economic system today, is split. There is a split between the professional military
136See, for instance, an intervit v with Commander of VDV Gen. Achnlov, in V. Zyubin, "O demokratii i
poryadke," Krasnaya zvezda, Ai 'ust 8, 1990.
137RFE/RL, Daily Report, no. 86, September 28, 1990.
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and the defense industry, with the former blaming the latter for poor quality of
weapons. 138 The Navy and the shipbuilding industry have been pointing accusing fingers
at each other as a result of the MIKE submarine disaster in April 1989. 139 As indicated
above, some highly influential ground forces' officers are beginning to openly view the
Navy as a drain on scarce defense resources. While Gorbachev has appeared to show
some special interest in the Navy (until his speech to Ground Forces officers near Odessa
on August 17, 1990, his only photo opportunities with the military had been with the
Navy, in Vladivostok in 1986 and Severomorsk in 1988), the VMF has a minimum utility
for maintaining some degree of domestic stability, which is rapidly becoming the main
mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Ground Forces, on the other hand, are crucial
for this mission. This factor is likely to have a negative impact on the Navy's ability to
compete for resources in a 1 3an defense budget.
As for the potential impact of Russian nationalism, this highly diverse and
contradictory political mcvement is split into various partially overlapping political
groupings, which are only beginning to formulate their attitudes to the naval problems.
The "left" democratic wing of Russian nationalism effectively shares its national security
agenda with the "new thinkers." The RSFSR Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Boris
Yeltsin has Moscow intellectuals as his advisors; these individuals are from the same milieu
as most of the "new thinkers," and are likely to share their views when it comes to military
policies. The Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs
Vladimir Lukin, for instance, has called for drastic reductions of the Soviet conventional
forces due to easing of international tensions, and said that the Soviet Union should
exclude defense of Eastern Europe from its military obligations. He has also suggested that
138See, for instance, D. T. Yazov, "Povyshaf otdachu voennoy nauki," Krasnaya zvezda, August 14, 1988;
Douglas L. Clarke, "Soviet Military Newspaper Blasts Blackjack Bomber Program," Report on the USSR,
May 25, 1990.
139See Aleksandr Yemel'yanenkov, "Argumenty admirala Chernova," Sobesednik, July 1990, no. 30;
"Zavershila rabotu pravitel'sh ennaya komissiya," Morskoly sbornik, no. 6, 1990, pp. 17, 18; A.
Emel'ianenkov, "Podvodnye tecl Miiya," Komsomol'.skaya pravda, Febrt.iry 8, 1990.
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Russia is to play a role as a bridge between Europe and Asia, a geopolitical concept close to
that of some "new thinkers" who see Russia as primarily an Eurasian land power. 140 A
prominent candidate for the new job of RSFSR Minister of Defense is Tatyana Koryagina,
a radical politician and a woman, both factors certainly profoundly shocking to the senior
military officers. 141 The recently apopointed first Minister of Foreign Affairs of RSFSR is
Andrei Kozyrev, a 39-year old diplomat whose published views closely correspond to the
"new thinking." 142 Yeltsin and his aides have not addressed the naval issues, but they are
likely to endorse the "new thinkers'" proposals to make the VMF defensive and
substantially less expensive.
In his recent appeal to the Russian people widely publicized in the USSR,
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a centrist anti-communist Russian nationalist, has advocated
Russia's isolationism, including independence for all non-Slavic Union Republics. Hostile
to Communist internationalism, he described the ocean-going Soviet Navy as a symbol of
the communists' striving for world domination at Russia's expense, and as prime candidate
for budget cuts in order to solve Russia's economic problems. 143
Even the "right-wing" Russian nationalists (the "empire-savers," in Roman
Szporluk's apt phrase) 144 whose main goals are preservation of the Soviet empire and of
the strong centralized state as a guarantee of Soviet/Russian status of a superpower, and
who are strongly committed to the military and highly critical of the "new thinking," are in
reality more ambiguous about the VMF than they might seem at a first glance. One of the
most coherent and influential spokesmen for this group, Aleksandr Prokhanov, has
described the acquisition of naval power as in effect a forced development for Russia:
140
"Na sluzhbe Otechestvu," Central TV, August 5, 1990.
141RFE/RL, Daily Report, no. 195, October 12, 1990
142/6/'</.; for his views, see A. Kozyrev, "Confidence and the Balance of Interests," International Affairs,
November 1988.
143Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Kak nam obustroit' Rossiyu? p.14.
144Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," Problems of Communism, July-August 1989,
pp. 15-35.
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Within the framework of [the policy of turning the USSR
into a global revolutionary superpower] a special role was
given to the Navy, which has always been for Russia a
subject of painful and complicated efforts, because history of
Russia is the history of a land power turning into a naval
power. The country was striving towards the ocean
breaking the shackles of internal problems, which kept us
firmly within the gravitational zone of large land spaces.
The long and laborious process has been completed in the
Soviet period. 145
If becoming a naval power has been so painful for Russia, one might question how suitable
that role is; if that process could be accomplished only in the course of building a deeply
dysfunctional social system, does Russia really need to be a naval power?
Behind all the naval ist rhetoric of right-wing Russian nationalists, there is the land-
power mentality at work. For instance, Karem Rash in a Morskoy sbornik article entitled
"The Oceanic Mentality," presents Russia's naval manifest destiny as essentially the
defense of the sacred periphery of the Soviet/Russian empire. Although he speaks about
the Russian "boys" defending "peace" throughout the world's oceans and about turning
Russia into a Pacific Ocean power, his plans for this transformation revolve around further
development of railroads linking the European Russia to the Far East! 146
This mentality sees the oceans as a passageway for threats against Russia that must
be blocked, rather than as an opening to the world and to new opportunities. When right-
wing Russian nationalists and conservative naval officers address the importance of oceans
to Russia, they emphasize the naval threat to Russia. 147 The era of maximum expansion of
Soviet communism in the 1970's was, in a way, an exception to the Russian naval history
because in its course a real attempt was made to treat oceans as a road to opening
145Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Na volnakh shtormovoy epokhi," Morskoy sbornik, no. 7, 1990, p. 3.
146Karem Rash, "Okeanicheskc e myshlenie," Morskcy sbornik, no. 7, 1989, p. 10.
147Ibid., p. S; Bobrakov, "Ot n< znakomstva s potrebnostyami voyny," p. 4.
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geopolitical opportunities. The demise of Soviet communism has destroyed the ideological
and economic foundation for this drive.
The main point of disagreement between the "new thinkers" and the Russian
nationalists of a more conservative variety concerns Russia's need to be integrated into an
international security system, and the latter's ability to provide for Russia's security. The
right-wing Russian nationalists tend to see the West (the essential partner for Russia in a
new international security system) with suspicion at best; when it comes to Russia's
defense needs, they will be unilateralists by choice. A centrist, anti-communist, anti-
internationalist like Solzhenitsyn would see the West with skepticism and its experience,
including that of international security arrangements, as meager or irrelevant to Russia. But
an isolationist Russia truncated out of the Soviet empire and not integrated into a common
security system in the Northern Hemisphere will find itself in a rather volatile environment,
and thus will have to be at least self-sufficient in its defense needs, a substantial
requirement given her size and the length of her borders, including the contiguous seas.
The Navy command is likely to side with the centrist to conservative Russian
nationalists. It shares a common interest in the Russian past (the Navy is more actively
than ever promoting the glorification of pre-revolutionary Russian naval traditions in order
to find a new ideology for its officers instead of the disgraced communist one). The basic
anti-internationalism of the Russian nationalists will appeal to the Navy because it continues
the tradition of entrusting Russia's security to the Russians and to their armed forces.
What will be the likely impact of the synthesis of all three forces at work (the "new
thinking," Russian nationalism, and the VMF's corporate self-interest) on the Navy's
missions? The Soviet Navy's mission of nuclear strikes against enemy territory is unlikely
to be affected in the immediate future. There is basic agreement among the three on the
need for Soviet nuclear deterrent. 148 This guarantees a continuing mission for SSBNs.
148For the views of Russian na onlist liberals, see "Na sluzhbe Otech stvu," Central TV, August 5, 1990.
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The reformers simply cannot generate enough political heat to change Soviet SSBNs
targeting plans and fleet size. The economic pressure and relative unreliability of
technology and personnel, however, can force the VMF to select a conservative bastion-
centered mode of SSBNs deployment, which will reduce the utility of older SSBNs with
shorter-range SLBMs for this mission.
The strategic ASW is likely to lose the preemptive character (if it ever had it in
reality, given the limited Soviet capabilities) attributed to it by some recent VMF
pronouncements. Even without a clear political victory of the "new thinkers" opposed to
the mission of Repulsion of Aerospace Attack, the economic pressures will curtail the
Soviet capabilities for thi: mission because both the required extensive training and
acquisitions are likely be affected by the budget cuts. However, the VMF will continue to
be interested in extending its air defense to the offshore areas.
The mission of interdicting enemy SLOCs has been given additional prominence by
C-in-c Adm. Chernavin's personal advocacy. Chernavin's views of SLOC interdiction,
however, run against the grain of the "new thinking," as he assumes carrying out attacks
on enemy land based facilities broadly associated with shipping, resulting (as Chernavin
notes himself) in an escalation. As the possibility of a war in Europe involving the USSR
and U.S. diminish (a scenario of the "new thinkers"), this mission would lose both its
priority and its potentially escalatory character. A success of current naval blockade of Iraq
may furnish the VMF with an opportunity to plan for future SLOC interdiction missions
within the UN context ~ provided that the Soviet national security policy becomes more
inclined in practice towards similar multilateral actions. The impact of Russian nationalists
on this mission is difficult to predict.
The mission of destruction of enemy groupings of forces is likely to concentrate
more on direct support for land operations at the expense of attempts to establish sea
control. Here the aversion of the "new thinkers" to acqriring an expens ve offensive
capability combined with the centrist Russian nationalists' i: Mationism and fi cal prudence
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are likely to overcome the "right-wing" Russian nationalists' and the Navy command's
desire to develop a maximum capability against the Western "threat." Of great significance
to this mission is the future of the Soviet Tbilisi-class aircraft carriers: if this program is
cancelled, as the "new thinkers" insist, then the VMF would have a hard time planning for
naval battles more than a few hundred miles away from the Soviet shores. A survival of
the carrier program in the medium term will mean that contrary to this author's
expectations, the VMF is developing a new capability for sea control.
The mission of supporting national-liberation and leftist regimes in the Third World
seems to be practically eliminated by the decline of communist ideology and the wide
unpopularity of aid to such regimes. Nobody seems to argue in favor of continuing such
involvement. The outcome of the current Persian Gulf crisis will influence the Soviet
policies in this area: a victory of the anti-Iraq coalition might make the idea of Soviet naval
participation in UN-sponsored multilateral operations acceptable both to the "new thinkers"
and the naval traditionalists; a defeat will aggravate the conflict between the two, with the
"new thinkers" using it as an example of the futility of using force, and with the
traditionalists arguing in favor of support to radical Third World clients. The centrist and
right-wing Russian nationalists are likely to argue against any participation in such
multilateral operations, although for different reasons.
Even if severe cuts are carried out, the Soviet Navy will continue to be a major
force to reckon with. The Soviet Union's status as a nuclear superpower with a sea-based
nuclear arsenal simply does not leave it an option of abandoning its Navy, as practically
happened in the 1920's. Ensuring the survivability of its submarine-based nuclear forces
requires substantial general purpose naval force. In the absence of intricate naval arms
control and confidence-building measures and agreements (if these are feasible at all) even
in a favorable political situation, SSBN's cannot be left without some degree of reliable
protection. Instability around the perimeter of the Soviet Union or its successor will
require a certain level of naval activity i 1 the contiguous seas. Unless a reliable new
57
international security system arises, Soviet or its successor state security will continue to
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